Abstract-This paper studies cooperative relay-based neighborhood area networks in smart grid, where the building gateway with better channel condition will forward the energy consumption information originated from the congested building gateways to the data aggregator unit, in order to improve the accuracy of energy consumption information gathered at the data aggregator. This can make the consumers reserve accurate energy from the public utility with a low price, and further reduce the electricity cost. Relay power allocation is important to the efficiency of the cooperative relaying in cost reduction. The paper is motivated by these two interesting questions: How the relay building gateway allocates transmission power between relaying and its own transmission and what is the optimal relay power allocation strategy among the other buildings gateways? In order to answer the questions, we formulate the power allocation problem as a Stackelberg game and prove that it has a unique equilibrium point, which is the optimal power allocation solution for the building gateways. Numerical results show that relaying can dramatically reduce the cost of consumers in a building.
the destination, in order to combat the impact of fading and improve the transmission rates [6] . In [7] , cooperative relay is proposed for HAN in smart grid, in order to combat fading without considering the cost reduction problem. In [8] , D. Niyato et al. proposed a cooperative relay-based meter data collection networks in smart grid, in order to reduce the electricity cost for consumers in the community.
In this paper, we aim to apply cooperative relaying to NAN in smart grid, in order to reduce the electricity cost. The motivation for this work is as follows. In general, the operation of an electricity market consists of two stages due to the uncertain electricity demand and supply [8, 9] . In the first stage, consumers reserve the electricity supply with a lower price from the public utility. To implement the reservation, the building gateways should forward the reservation information from the consumers to the data aggregator unit (DAU), which sends the reservation information to the control center to reserve the electricity supply from the electricity market. Unfortunately, some building gateways may suffer from congestions due to simultaneous data transmissions for consumers in the buildings. Thus, the reserved electricity supply is less than the actual electricity demand due to data packet loss from congestions. To meet the electricity demands, consumers purchase additional electricity from the public utility with a higher price for immediate use in the second stage. This increases the electricity cost for the consumers in the buildings. This paper will address the following question: How to improve the accuracy of electricity reservation so as to reduce the electricity cost?
In this paper, we will design a more efficient electricity reservation strategy by improving the transmission rates of the building gateways. Cooperative relay is a desirable method to improve the transmission rates, which we will leverage to design a cooperative relay-based NAN for smart grid, in order to mitigate the congestion and reduce the electricity cost. However, the performance of cooperative relay relies on the transmission power allocation of the relay. It is important to allocate the relay power in order to minimize the electricity cost. In practice, the infrastructure cost involved in the deployment of a relay station is very large. It is reasonable to select the building gateway in each community with better channel condition as the relay (RBG), which not only forwards the data originated from other congested building gateways (CBG), but also transmits its own data to the DAU. Thus, the cost of the RBG consists of two parts: the relaying cost and the electricity cost. This paper will also address the following questions: How should the RBG determine the power allocation for relaying and the direct transmission of its own data? How to allocate the relay power for CBGs? This paper will shed some lights on the above questions and present an optimal relay power allocation strategy based on the Stackelberg game, which is suitable for dealing with the multi-stage decision making problem in communication networks. The main contribution of the proposed method is to reduce the electricity cost of consumers in smart buildings, and also balance the reserved electricity and supply for public utility.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II, we describe the system model and formulate the power allocation problem as a Stackelberg game. In section III, the equilibrium analysis is given and the Stackelberg equilibrium is obtained. Simulation results are shown in section IV. Finally, concluding remarks are given in section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION

A. Electricity Cost
We assume a power system consists of N buildings and one DAU. As given in [8] , the packet loss rate due to congestion at the CBG i , iN  can be denoted by , 0,
where i L is the packet loss rate of CBG i , and i R is the total number of packets generated from consumers in building i . i R denotes the transmission rates of CBG i . According to [8] , we have the electricity cost of consumers in building i ,
In (2) 
From (3), we see that i V is decreasing with the transmission rate i R . In general, the total load and the number of generated packets are proportional to the number of apartments or offices, since the average energy consumption of an apartment or office is approximately the same in case that one building consists of huge number of apartments or offices. Thus, we assume that the electricity demand of one building is proportional to the number of generated packets, i.e., ii D R k  . From (3), we see that the CBGs can reduce the electricity cost by improving the transmission rates, e.g., selecting the building gateways with better channel conditions as relays.
B. Cooperative Relay modeling
As shown in Fig. 1 , we consider a neighborhood area network in smart grid, consisting of several building gateways and one DAU. The building gateways are organized into different cooperative groups, in which we select the building gateway with better channel condition as the relay. The grouping is out of the scope of our paper, for a lot of grouping algorithms has been proposed in cooperative relay networks [10] [11] [12] . Some of them can be applied to our problem directly. In the following, we only consider the cooperative relaying in one group.
The network is based on frequency division multiple access (FDMA) and each building gateway is allocated W Herz bandwidth for transmission. Without the loss of generality, we employ the decode-and-forward (DF) cooperation protocol in our system model. The relaying is composed of two scheduled time slots: within the first time slot, the CBG broadcasts its signal to the DAU and the RBG while the RBG decodes this signal and then transmits it in the second time slot.
In the first sub-time slot, the received signal at the RBG and DAU is denoted by , ir y and ,
where i x is the symbol transmitted by CBG i and i p is the corresponding transmission power. The channels are modeled as independent proper complex Gaussian random variables, invariant within each slot, but generally varying over the slots (i.e., Rayleigh block-fading channels). The instantaneous fading channels in each block are denoted by the notations as follows: , N . The signals received in the first sub-time slot and the second sub-time slot are combined together by the DAU. According to [6] , the achievable rates of CBG i at the output of the maximal ratio combining (MRC) detector is given by 2 , , ,
min{log (1 ),log 1 2
where 2 , , 0 
The maximum rate constraint in (8) is due to the fact that the individual capacity of relay-assisted CBG should not exceed the capacity of the CBG to the RBG for reliable decoding of the signal at the RBG. If the direct link (from the CBG to the DAU) is better than the relay link (from the CBG to the RBG), the CBG, which is constrained by the maximal relay capacity, will not be assisted by the RBG. Thus, the individual power constraints can be obtained from the maximum rate constraint (8) 
Here, each RBG also has the total power constraints denoted by r p .
C. Problem Formulation
We assume that all of the building gateways are rational and selfish. The RBG is willing to share portions of its transmission power with the CBGs, and earn revenue paid by CBGs so as to compensate the electricity cost. It has the rights to decide the fraction of transmission power leased to the CBGs. Whereas, the CBG, which is competitive with other CBGs for the transmission power, decides only the price it is willing to pay for the RBG, in order to minimize the electricity cost without making too much payments. According to the actions of the CBGs and the RBG, we employ a Stackelberg-game-based scheme as follows:
N denotes the whole set of CBGs in the system. Each CBG i is willing to minimize the electricity cost under a reasonable payment i c . Therefore, the total cost of CBG i is defined to be its electricity cost plus the payments it makes for the RBG  is zero when all of the payments are zero, i.e., the RBG will not relay for any CBG. Then, the electricity cost of CBG i is denoted by 0 ,
2 RBG/Leader. The RBG will transmits its own energy reservation information to the DAU with the remaining transmission power (1 )
. It can get the revenue from CBGs in order to compensate for the increased electricity cost, which is incurred by relaying for CBGs. Therefore, the total cost of the RBG is defined to be the electricity cost minus the revenue it collects from the CBGs 
where r D is the electricity demand generated from consumers in the RBG.
Here, minimizing the total cost is equivalent to maximize ii uC  and rr uC  , which are defined as the utilities of the CBG i and RBG, respectively. For convenience, we will maximize the utilities of CBGs and RBG instead of minimize the cost of them.
III. GAME ANALYSIS
In this section, we use the backward induction method to analyze the performance of the Stackelberg game.
A. Payment Selection Game
The CBGs in the cooperative set I will compete with each other to minimize the total cost i.e., maximizing its own utility. Then, there is the following non-cooperative payment selection game (NPS). G . The solution we use is the Nash equilibrium [13] , which is based on the concept of a best response correspondence defined as follows. 
2( )
where,
Here, another solution of equation (16) 
It is shown in [15] that the fixed point () r c = c is unique for a standard function. Therefore, we can show the uniqueness of the game G by proving that the best response function () r c is a standard function, which is defined as follows. 
Then, we give the condition on uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in the following theorem. 
We obtain the expressions of the unique equilibrium point for the non-cooperative payment selection game as Theorem 3: The unique equilibrium point for the non-cooperative payment selection game G is given by
Substituting (21) into (6), we have
According to constraints (22), we can select the optimal subset I  for CBGs participating in cooperation.
B. Minimizing RBG's Utility
Based on the analytical results of the CBG's payment selection game, the leader of the Stackelberg game, the RBG, can optimize its strategy ( , ) I  in order to minimize its total cost in (12) i.e., maximizing the utility r u . Substituting (21) into (12) , the utility of the RBG is given by 
where, Fig. 3 , the RBG will not forward any data for CBGs at first, since relaying can't reduce the cost. When the distance between the RBG and the DAU is below some threshold, the RBG will start to forward data for CBGs since relaying can reduce the total cost of the RBG. There exists a maximal power allocation fraction . When Rx approaches to Rx  , the revenue obtained from CBGs is larger than the increasing electricity cost incurred by relaying. Thus, the RBG will increase power allocation for relaying in order to reduce the total cost as much as possible. When Rx approaches to Rx  , the transmission rate from the RBG to the DAU is increased. Therefore, the RBG will allocate more power for the direct transmission in order to reduce the electricity cost, i.e., the optimal power allocation strategy   will be decreased as Rx approaches to Rx  . From Fig. 3 , we can also see that cooperation will start earlier and   becomes larger when the number of CBG increases. This is because the relaying plays a more important role in the total cost of the RBG, which has more willingness to cooperate with CBGs and allocate more power for relaying. brings about the lowest total cost, because relaying can make appropriate tradeoff between the increase of electricity cost and the revenue obtained from the CBGs. Fig. 4 also indicates that the total cost is decreased when the RBG approaches to the DAU due to the improved direct transmission rate.
We give the payment strategies of different CBGs in Fig.5 , CBGs will pay more to the RBG, in order to make RBG cooperate with them when the RBG approaches to the DAU. However, the price will get saturated finally, because CBGs will not increase their payments when relaying can't reduce the cost. Fig. 6 shows the cost of CBGs versus the locations of the RBG. It can be seen that all the CBGs can reduce the cost by relaying. This paper presents an optimal power allocation scheme for cooperative relay-based neighborhood area networks in smart grid. By formulating the power allocation problem as a Stackelberg game, where the congested building gateways act as the followers and the relay building gateway acts as the leader, we derive an optimal power allocation solution. Numerical results illustrate that the relaying with optimal power allocation can reduce the total cost of consumers in smart buildings. 
